ABSTRACT In ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) schemes, the computational overhead and the length for the ciphertext are positively correlated with the complexity of the access structure. In addition, the access structure embedded in ciphertext may be a leak sensitive information for the user. In order to solve the above issues, we provide a constant size ciphertext distributed CP-ABE scheme with privacy protection and fully hiding access policy (PPFH-CP-ABE) scheme. Our scheme can protect user's privacy from the following two aspects: 1) A user obtains private keys for his attributes from different authorities who get nothing about user's global identifier (GID) and attributes and 2) Access structure in the ciphertext is fully hidden. In addition, our scheme is able to resist the collusion attacks since the user's GID is nonlinearly bound to his private key from each authority. The presented scheme is proven CPA-secure in selective security model under the decisional DBDH assumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Attribute-based encryption(ABE) simultaneously provides data confidentiality and flexible access control and has been regarded as an advanced technology for one-to-more data sharing in cloud storage server [1] - [3] . An ABE scheme usually consists of attribute authority (AA), users, data owner, and cloud server. User's identity is described by a set of attributes (i.e., age, name, gender, address, E-mail, etc.). AA issues private key for the user's attributes. Data owner uses an access structure to encrypt the file and then uploads the encrypted file to the cloud server. The user obtains the private key for his attributes from AA. If the user intends to access the encrypted file, he first downloads the encrypted file from the cloud server and then compares whether the attribute set related to private key matches the access policy embedded in encrypted file. We divide ABE schemes into two types: key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) schemes [1] , [2] , [4] - [7] and
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CP-ABE scheme [3] , [8] - [11] . In CP-ABE scheme, access policy is embedded in the ciphertext, while the secret key is related to his attributes. KP-ABE scheme is inverse.
In ABE schemes, the single attribute authority is so powerful and may become an assailable point for the performance bottlenecks and security attacks in the large-scale systems. In order to alleviate the power of the single AA, Chase et al. [5] provided a multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) scheme. In multi-authority ABE schemes, multiple AAs manage disjoint sets of attributes. The users obtain private keys for their attributes by interacting with multiple AAs. In ABE schemes, the user's identity is able to be recognized by distinguishing the attributes held by the user. On special occasions, these privacy-sensitive attributes (i.e., ID number, E-mail, etc.) are required to disclose. Hence, if MA-ABE scheme failed to protect the privacy of users then all AAs may share user's attributes to infer the user's identity. In CP-ABE schemes [3] , [8] , access policy is sent to data users along with ciphertext. But access policy contains sensitive information. In order to solve this problem, Dan and Waters [12] presented a hidden vector encryption scheme in predicate encryption system. Nishide et al. [13] presented a selectively secure ABE scheme with partially hidden access structure. Lai et al. [14] presented a CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access policy, which is proved fully secure. In order to solve keyword search in ciphertext, Li et al. [15] provided a searchable CP-ABE scheme with revocation in cloud storage, in which access structures are partially hidden. In order to improve efficiency, Li et al. [16] presented an outsourcing ABE scheme with keyword search function for cloud storage. Li et al. [17] provided a hidden access policy CP-ABE scheme with decryption testing. In the above schemes [12] - [17] , only one authority monitors and issues user's private key. In fact, multiple entities are required to act as authorities on many occasions. Therefore, hiding the access structures in MA-ABE scheme is also crucial in order to protect users' privacy.
In CP-ABE schemes [2] , [3] , [18] , the ciphertext size grows linearly with the number of attributes in access structures, which increases the communication overhead on receivers. Furthermore, the number of pairing operation is also linearly with the number of attributes in access policy during decryption, which increases the computation cost on receivers. These defects to a great extent limit the practical application of the ABE scheme, it is important for the scenarios where bandwidth resources and computing resources are limited. Hence this paper also focuses on ensuring the length of the ciphertext and the decryption overhead are constant.
ABE scheme may be used in the smart grid system [19] , which smart grids control center uses ABE scheme to encrypt message, and the specified group of users (smart meters) can get the message through the decryption operation. This application may be used by smart phones user, so the bandwidth resources is limited in the system. In this case, we extremely need to guarantee constant size ciphertext. The user in the specified group individually decrypts the message according to its attributes. The attributes (e.g., type of electrical equipment, location, subscription package) may be sensitive and be likely to reveal user's private information (e.g., day-to-day electricity usage). If the users' private information is leaked, it will harm the interests of the users. This vulnerability is mitigated by ABE scheme.
A. RELATED WORK
Currently, access control policy based on ABE has been widely used, such as the references [20] - [22] . The previous ABE schemes [1] , [2] were developed using single AA, which leads to greater power being concentrated in single AA. We easily observed the following drawbacks in schemes [1] , [2] . First, the identity of each user needs to be validated by the authority and it is a difficult task to manage numerous user's identities, particularly in a large distributed system. Second, each user must absolutely trust this attribute authority. If the attribute authority is corrupted, he is able to simulate any user to execute decryption operations without being detected. To decrease the dependence on the attribute authority, Chase [5] presented a multi-authority ABE scheme, which multiple AAs manage disjoint attributes sets, and interact with users to obtain the private key associated with their attributes. In addition, Lewko and Waters [23] provided a distributed CP-ABE scheme without the central authority.
The above distributed ABE schemes [5] , [23] do not consider the user's privacy issue. In order to solve this problem, Chase and Chow [6] provided a multi-authority ABE scheme, which improves privacy and security in [5] . Han et al. [7] presented a decentralized KP-ABE scheme with privacy protection, which enables users to interact with different AAs by anonymous protocol to obtain the private keys related to his attributes. In order to resist collusion attack, Li et al. [10] , [11] provided two user collusion avoidance CP-ABE schemes. Han et al. [25] and Rahulamathavan et al. [26] provided two decentralized ABE schemes which resist collusion attack and improve privacy and security. Qian et al. [24] used multiauthority ABE to present a privacy preserving personal health record scheme.
The client may use resource-constrained devices such as smart phones, it is necessary for us to use short ciphertext. The first CP-ABE scheme with constant ciphertext length was presented by Emura et al. [27] , but the access policy in this scheme is restricted to AND-gates ((t, t)-threshold). Herranz et al. [9] also constructed a constant size ciphertext CP-ABE scheme, which used the (t, n)-threshold policy. But this scheme is not very efficient, since the encryption algorithm demands n+t+1 exponential operations and the decryption algorithm demands 3 pairings operations and O(t 2 ) exponential operations. Attrapadung et al. [28] presented KP-ABE scheme with constant ciphertext length, which allows expressing non-monotonic access structures. However, the private key in this scheme had square size. The exponential operations in decryption and encryption were linear with the access structure and the number of attributes of ciphertext, respectively. To improve the efficiency, Chen et al. [29] proposed the efficient CP-ABE with fixed length ciphertext and fixed computational costs, which is proven to be CPA-secure. In the scheme, the encryption algorithm utilized only 3 exponentiations and the decryption algorithm utilized only 2 pairing operations. Li et al. [30] proposed a verifiably outsourced decryption ABE scheme with constant size ciphertext, where both of the size of ciphertext and the number of expensive pairing operations are constant. The above schemes [27] - [30] can be applied in cloud storage [31] , [32] . In order to improve efficiency and ensure the correctness of the outsourced operation, Ning et al. [34] presented an auditable σ -time outsourced ABE scheme. Zuo et al. [35] provided an ABE scheme with outsourced decryption, which was proved CCA-secure. Furthermore, Li et al. [36] presented an outsourced decryption in ABE with full verifiability. In order to trace traitors who intentionally leak decryption keys for profits, Ning et al. [37] , [38] provided two white-box traceable CP-ABE schemes, which can be applied in social networks [39] , [40] and cloud VOLUME 7, 2019 storage service [41] . Recently, Li et al. presented a KP-ABE scheme [42] and hierarchical ABE scheme [43] , which is resilient to continual input leakage. Hu et al. provided a multiauthorities CP-ABE scheme with privacy-preserving [44] and a two-party attribute-based key agreement protocol [45] .
Although many of the existing schemes [27] - [30] , [33] have realized constant size ciphertext, all of these approaches used a single authority to issue the public keys and private keys. The single authority can generate private key of any user and perform the decryption operation in the system accordingly. Therefore, the key escrow problem is inherent. In multi-authority ABE schemes, the user's private keys are generated by different authorities, which can alleviate key escrow problem. However, it is a new challenge for us to design multi-authority ABE schemes with constant ciphertext length. Chen et al. [33] provided a multi-authority CP-ABE scheme having constant size ciphertext and efficient attribute revocation in cloud computing, which employs the access structure of and-gates on multi-value attributes.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION
Inspired by the literature [17] , [25] , we present a PPFH-CP-ABE scheme in cloud computing, which adopts the access policy of AND, OR gates on multi-valued attributes (AND/OR) m . Compared with the existing multi-authority CP-ABE schemes, our PPFH-CP-ABE scheme has the following feature. (1) Our PPFH-CP-ABE scheme can provide efficient privacy protection for cloud storage systems. On the one hand, when multiple authorities generate private keys for users, they do not obtain any information about user's identifier and attribute. On the other hand, the access structure in ciphertext is fully hidden. Existing multi-authority ABE schemes about privacy protection failed to simultaneously consider these two factors. (2) The proposed scheme employs AND, OR gates on multi-valued attributes, and has the properties of constant size ciphertext and constant decryption time. (3) Our scheme is proven CPA-secure in the standard model. Since user's private key is tied to his GID nonlinearly, our scheme can resist the collusion attacks. Experimental result and theoretical analysis show that the computational overhead for encryption and decryption is lower.
The remaining parts in this article are organized as below. We introduce some preliminaries in Section II. Then, we first propose a PPFH-CP-ABE scheme in Section III and prove its security in Section IV. We provide performance analysis and experimental simulations in Section V. Finally, the conclusion of the article is given in section VI. , g b , g c , e(g, g) z ) = 1] is defined as the advantage for adversary B.
B. ACCESS POLICY
Definition 2: Let = (P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n ) be n parties. The collection A ⊆ 2 {P 1 ,P 2 ,··· ,P n } is mon otonic when any B, C fulfills that B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ∈ A. The access policy is a collection A that A ⊆ 2 {P 1 ,P 2 ,··· ,P n } \{φ}. The sets not in (2 + |I | + |AS|)|G| are denoted as the unauthorized sets, and the sets in A are denoted as the authorized sets.
The access structure in the scheme is AND, OR gates on multi-valued attributes. This access policy is a monotone access structure and the definition is as below: Because the access policy is fully hidden in our PPFH-CP-ABE scheme, the access structure cannot be explicitly included in the ciphertext. Therefore, the user only knows whether he has the ability to decrypt, without knowing any other information. Before encryption, the data owner first converts the access structure W to an access tree ϒ. The intermediate nodes of the tree represent ∧ or ∨ operations, and the leaf nodes represent attribute values. The transformation process is presented as follows: Data owner sets s as root node, makes all child nodes as unread and the root node as read. For every non-leaf node that is unread, the data owner performs the following procedure:
(1) If its child nodes are unread and the operator in access policy is ∧, the data owner randomly chooses s i ∈ R Z * p (1 < s i < p − 1) for every child node. The data owner sets the last child node as s k = s − k−1 i−1 s i mod p and marks these nodes as read.
(2) If its child nodes are unread and the operator in access policy is ∨, the data owner sets the value for child node to be s i and marks this node as read. this access tree, for example,
C. DISTRIBUTED CP-ABE
A distributed CP-ABE scheme includes the following five algorithms:
Global Setup (1 λ ) → params: This algorithm takes a security parameter 1 λ as input, it outputs the public parameter params. Assume that there exist n A authorities {A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A n A } in system, and every authority A i supervises attribute setÃ i . Every user U has a unique global identifier GID U = u and a attribute setŨ .
The algorithm takes security parameter 1 λ as input, it outputs master secret-public key pair (MK i , PK i ) for each authority A i .
Encryption (params, M , W, (PK i ) i∈I ) → CT : This algorithm takes message M , the public parameter params, access structures W and public key PK = {PK i , i ∈ I } as input, it outputs the ciphertext CT.
KeyGen (params, MK i∈I , GID U ,Ũ ∩Ã i ) → SK i U : This algorithm takes the master secret key MK i∈I , a set of attributes U ∩Ã i , the public parameterparams, and a user's global identifier GID U as input, it outputs private key SK i U of U . Decryption (params, GID U , (SK i U ) i∈I , CT ) → M : This algorithm takes the private keys (SK i U ) i∈I and the ciphertext CT, the public parameter params, and user's global identifier GID U as input, it outputs the message M .
Definition 4:A distributed CP-ABE scheme is correct if [17] , [24] The selective IND-CPA security for distributed CP-ABE is defined by the following game:
Initialization: The adversary A submits two challenge access structures W * 1 , W * 2 , and a list of corrupted authorities C A = {A i } i∈I with |C A | < n A , where I ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n A }.
Global Setup: The challenger executes algorithm Global Setup to output the public parameters params, and returns it to adversaryA. Authority Setup: Three cases are considered.
(1) For the corrupted authorities, the challenger executes algorithm Authority Setup to output the master public-secret key pair (MK i , PK i ), and sends it to adversary A.
(2) For the honest authorities, the challenger executes algorithm Authority Setup to output the master public-secret key pair (MK i , PK i ), and only sends public key PK i to adversary A.
(3) For the half-honest authorities, the challenger executes Authority Setup algorithm to generate the master publicsecret key pair (MK i , PK i ), and sends public key PK i and parts for master secret keys MK i to A.
Phase 1: A submits the attribute listŨ to query private key of user U with an identifier u.
, the challenger runs the algorithm KeyGen to generate a private key SK U and sends it to A. This query is launched repeatedly and adaptively.
Challenge: The adversary A sends two same size massages M 0 and M 1 to the challenger. The challenger randomly choosesθ ∈ R {0, 1} and executes the Encryption algorithm to output the challenged ciphertext CT * ϑ , and then returns CT * ϑ toA. Note that if the adversary obtains the SK U and
Phase 2: It is same as Phase 1. Guess: Fastly, A outputs the guessθ forθ. Ifθ =θ, A wins the game.
Definition 5: A distributed CP-ABE scheme with hidden access policy is (t, q, ε(λ)) secure in the selective security model when all t-time adversary launches at most q secret key queries and succeeds in the game at negligible advantage ε(λ).
E. FORMAL DEFINITION OF PPFH-CP-ABE
A PPFH-CP-ABE is defined as a modified distributed CP-ABE scheme with hidden access structure. The main disparity is that we substitute the algorithm KeyGen with the privacy protection key extract algorithm (PPKeyExt) [25] . To protect user's privacy, the authorities do not get any information about user's identifier and attributes in our scheme. The PPKeyExt algorithm is formalized as follows. 
F. SECURITY MODEL OF PPFH-CP-ABE
The security for PPFH-CP-ABE scheme is defined via arbitrary IND-CPA-secure distributed CP-ABE scheme with hiding access policy, and requires PPKeyExt algorithm satisfying two properties: leak-freeness and selective-failure blindness [25] . Definition 6: We say that a PPFH-CP-ABE = (Authority Setup, Global Setup, Encryption, PPKeyExt, Decryption) is secure when it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) = (Authority Setup, Global Setup, Encryption, KeyGen, Decryption) is a secure distributed CP-ABE scheme with hiding access policy in the selective IND-CPA security model;
(2) The PPKeyExt algorithm is both selective-failure blind and leak-free [25] .
III. OUR CONSTRUCTIONS
The PPFH-CP-ABE scheme has four entities: data owner, authorities, users and cloud server. The data owner executes the Encryption algorithm to encrypt files and then uploads the encrypted files to the cloud server. The authority executes the algorithmAuthority Setup to obtain the master secret-public key pair (MK i , PK i ) for itself. The authority performs the PPKeyExt algorithm with the user to generate the private key SK i U for every user. The user executes the Decryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted files downloaded from the cloud. The cloud server provides storage and computation services. Based on schemes [17] , we construct a PPFH-CP-ABE scheme = (Global Setup, Authority Setup, Encryption, PPKeyExt, Decryption) as follows:
Global Setup. This algorithm inputs a security parameter 1 λ , and then outputs public parameter params = (g, y, e, p Authority Setup. Each authority A i chooses α i , β i , γ i ∈ R Z p , and calculates
and keeps the master secret key
Encryption. To encrypt message M ∈ G T under the access structure W, the data owner firstly transforms the access structure W of AND, OR gates on multi-valued attributes to a tree access structures ϒ according to the transformation rule. Data owner chooses a random number s ∈ R Z * p and computes
where I is an index set of authorities A i , and the attributes managed by A i are used to encrypt messages M . Data owner sets s as the value of root node, marks the root node as read and marks all child nodes as unread. For every unread non-leaf node, the data owner performs the following procedure:
(1) If its child nodes are unread and the operator in access structure is ∧, the data owner randomly chooses s i ∈ R Z * p (1 < s i < p − 1) for every child node. For the last child node, the data owner sets s k = s − (2) If its child nodes are unread and the operator in access structure is ∨, the data owner sets s i as the value of child node and labels this node as read.
(3) The data owner calculates
This algorithm outputs ciphertext CT
PPKeyExt. Denote the user's global identifier GID by u. Assume that the user's attribute
To generate private key for U , A i firstly chooses t U ,i , d U ,i ∈ R Z p . The private key SK i U for U is calculated as follows:
Decryption. The user U inputs his private key SK i U and CT, and decrypts as below.
IV. PROOF OF SECURITY
Theorem 1: If the (t , ε (λ))-decisional DBDH assumption holds on (e, p, G, G T ), our PPFH-CP-ABE scheme is (t, q, ε(λ)) secure in the selective security model, where t = t + O(t) and ε (λ) = 1 2 ε(λ).
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A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Suppose that the adversary A has non-negligible advantage (t, q, ε(λ)) against our construction. Then, we can find an algorithm B break the decisional DBDH assumption with advantage 1 2 ε(λ) by interacting with A. Let (e, p, G, G T ) be the bilinear group. The challenger selects generator g ∈ R G. Given the DBDH instance  (g a , g b , g c , Z = e(g, g) z ) and (g a , g b , g c , Z = (g, g) abc ) . The challenger randomly selects ϑ ∈ {0, 1}. If ϑ = 0, he sends (g a , g b , g c , Z = (g, g) abc ) to B; Otherwise, he sub- mits (g a , g b , g c , Z = e(g, g) z ) to B, where z ∈ Z p . B outputs his guess ϑ on ϑ.
Initialization. The adversary A submits the challenge access structure
, and a list of corrupted authorities C A with index I ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n A }.
Global Setup. B selects δ ∈ R Z p and computes y = g δ . B sends params = (g, y, e, p, G, G T ) to A.
Authority Setup.
(1) For the corrupted authority A i , the simulator B chooses
This means that the master secret key
(2) For the honest authority A i , the simulator B chooses α i , β i , γ i , z i j ,k ∈ R Z p , and computes
The simulator B computes attribute public keys Z i j ,k , T i j ,k as follows:
For half-honest authority A , the simulator B chooses β, γ , z j ,k ∈ R Z p as master secret keys and computes A = e(g, g) ba
The simulator B computes attribute public keys Z j ,k , T j ,k as follows:
Phase 1:
The adversary A adaptively queries private key of user U with GID u and attribute listŨ with the added restriction that (
. The simulator B works as below. (1) For the corrupted authority A i , the simulator B
(2) For the honest authority A i , the simulator B chooses
The simulator B sends the secret key
We claim that G j ,k is a valid secret key as follows:
Challenge: A sends two equal length message M 0 and M 1 to the simulatorB. If the adversary A obtains the SK U whose attribute listŨ satisfies (Ũ | = W * 1 ∧Ũ | = W * 2 ) in phase 1, then it is required that M 0 = M 1 . Simulator B randomly picks a bitθ from {0,1}. Then B computes the challenge ciphertext as below.
The simulator B generates C * 4 and C * 5 as follows. For each non-leaf node that is unread, simulator B proceeds as below.
(1) If its child nodes are unread and the notation in access policy is ∧, the data owner randomly picks s i ∈ R Z * p (1 < s i < p − 1) and sets s j = (2) If the notation in access policy is ∨, the data owner sets c as the value for this node and marks this node read. The encryptor calculates
Simulator B sends the ciphertext C * 
It is the same as phase 1.
Guess:A finally outputs a guessθ forθ. Ifθ =θ, B outputs ϑ = 0; else, B outputs ϑ = 1. Next we calculate the probability that B breaks the decisional DBDH.
If Ultimately, the advantage that B breaks the decisional DBDH is
B. SECURITY OF THE PPKEYEXT ALGORITHM
When the authority A i generates the user's private key SK i U , A i chooses two random (t U ,i , d U ,i ) and uses them to bind the user's private key with his GID. If
y −β i , and knows the user's attributes and GID. In order to protect user's attributes and GID, (t U ,i , d U ,i ) is calculated by utilizing the 2-party secure computing technique [25] .
Theorem 2:
The key extract protocol with privacypreserving PPKeyExt in the scheme is both selective-failure blind and leak-free under the q-SDH assumption [25] .
Proof of theorem 2 is similar with the scheme [25] . The reader can refer to literature [25] for detail.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The notations that are used in the performance comparisons are presented in Table 1 . To indicate the practicability, we give function comparison between our scheme and schemes [17] , [25] , [33] in Table 2 . Our scheme satisfies user's GID privacy, hidden access policy and constant size ciphertext simultaneously.
In order to show the higher performance, we compare our scheme with three schemes in Table 3 . In Table 3,   TABLE 3 . Performance comparisons of multi-authorities CP-ABE schemes. the comparison results come from the access policy, the parameter size and computation cost.
We implement our scheme and schemes [17] , [25] , [33] by adopting a-curve symmetric elliptic curve, in which the embedding degree is 2 and the base field size is 512-bit. The a-curve has 160-bit group order. Our experiment is carried out in 64-bit Windows 7 operation system, Intel Core i7 processor with 8GB RAM. In order to simulate, we utilize the benchmark time values given in jPBC library [46] .
We compare the ciphertext length of the proposed scheme with schemes [17] , [25] , [33] . The relationship between ciphertext size and the number of attributes in access structure is shown in Fig. 2 . We clearly find that the ciphertext length increases linearly with number of attributes in [17] , [25] , while scheme [33] and our scheme can ensure constant size ciphertext.
The encryption time and decryption time are ascertained by the complexity of ciphertext policy. We design the number of attributes increasing from 20 to 100 in our experiment. Experiment results are shown in Fig.3 . and Fig.4 . According to Fig. 3 , the computation cost of encryption algorithm in [33] is the best. The computation cost of encryption algorithm in our scheme is almost the same as the scheme [17] and better than the scheme [25] . According to Fig. 4 , the computation cost of decryption algorithm in our scheme is almost the same as the scheme [33] and better than the scheme [17] , [25] . From table 1, only our scheme satisfies user's GID privacy, hidden access policy and constant size ciphertext simultaneously. Therefore, our scheme is efficient and privacy-preserving.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we present a constant size ciphertext distributed CP-ABE scheme with privacy protection and fully hiding access structure in cloud computing. Our scheme support privacy protection in cloud computing. The length of ciphertext and the overhead of decryption are constant and both of them are independent of the number of attributes in access structure, which reduce the communication cost and computation cost of the system. Additionally, the application of multiauthority alleviates the key escrow problem. The security of our scheme is proven CPA-secure in standard model under the decision DBDH assumption. The experimental results and the performance analysis show that our solution is efficient and can be used to control access for shared data in a cloud storage environment.
